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IN THE S·UPR.EME. COUR:T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\VILLARD R. WOOD, 
Plaintiff and Responden.t, 
-vs.-
STREVELL-P ATERSON HARDWARE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and .Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8632 
This .action arises out of a 1notor vehicle collision 
which occurred on the 13th day of October, 1954, about 
9:00 P.M. near the Saltair cutoff on U.S. Highway No. 
40 "\Ve.st of the Salt Lake City Airport. Both drivers 
"\Vere alone in their vehicles and were killed as a result 
of the collision. 
The action \Vas commenced by Mr. Wood to recover 
damages fro1n Appellant, for the destruction of one of 
the vehicles involved, which .at the time was being oper-
ated by one, Richard E. Gore, Mr. Wood's e1nployee. 
(It was stipulated at the time of trial that the value of 
Respondent's vehicle was $1,700.00.) 
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On the day in question, Mr. Wayne N. Stoker, who 
was an employee of Appellant, had been out toward 
Dugway, Utah and had called on Mr. Howard Rich, who 
operated an establishment about 10 miles this side of 
Dugway, Utah and had taken an order for merchandise 
from Mr. Rich. Mr. Stoker was returning to Salt Lake 
City at the time of the accident. 
The facts found at the scene of the accident show 
that the collision occurred at a point at least three f~eet 
into the lane of travel of the vehicle owned by ~Ir. Wood, 
Respondent. 
The two issues in the case before the trial court 
were whether Mr. Stoker was \vithin the course and 
scope of his employ for Appellant at the time of the 
accident and vvhether he was negligent. The trial court 
found both issues in favor of respondent and entered 
judgment accordingly. 
A further consideration of the facts \\ill be under-
taken in the points of argument. 
STATEMEN·T OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
'THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED, IF SUPPORTED BY SUFFI-
CIENT EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
WAYNE N. STOKER WAS WITHIN THE ·COURSE AND 
SICO·PE OF HIS EMPLOY FOR APPELLANT AT THE TIME 
OF THE COLLISION. 
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POINT III. 
WAYNE N. STOKER, 'THE AGENT FOR APPELLANT, 
WAS NEGLIGENT, AND SUCH NEGLIGENCE CAUSED 
THE COLLISION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT MUS'T BE AFFIRMED, IF SU'P'POR,TED BY SUFFI-
CIENT EVIDENCE. 
The sole contention of appellant is that the findings 
and judgment of the trial court (sitting without a jury) 
are not supported by sufficient evidence. However, Ap-
pellant, in its brief, is asking this court to reconsider all 
the evidence .and inferences arising therefrom in its favor 
and to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the trial 
court. 
The familiar rule which must govern this appeal is 
stated in 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, P. 699. 
"In connection with the above question ( evi-
dence to support or overturn findings) the appel-
late court's function is limited to an examination 
of the record to ascertain if sufficient evidence 
exists to justify the findings. If this is found, the 
·examination of the appellate court ceases. It will 
give no regard to rules as to the sufficiency of evi-
dence to establish a state of facts contrary to 
those found, nor will it, in accordanc-e with rule 
stated infra Sec. 1658, concern itself with the ques-
tion of wh·ere the preponderance of the evidence 
may lie, although, if the preponderance of the evi-
dence supports the findings, it is even more clear 
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that they should not be disturbed. 
"Under the rules set forth in subsection c 
above, the appellate court in determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sup·port the findings 
will indulge in every presumption in their favor, 
and give due weight to the trial court's superior 
advantages in passing on the facts, and judging 
the credibility of the witnes.ses. 
"When considering whether the findings have 
proper evidentiary support, the appellate court 
will eliminate from consideration all incompetent 
and linmaterial evidence, and consider only the 
evidence most favorable to the successful party, 
including all reasonable inferences which might 
have been drawn therefrom, which will be con-
strued most strongly in favor of the judgment.'' 
See also Seamons v. Anderson, 252 P.2d 209. (Utah), 
one of numerous Utah decisions, on this point. 
"The p,rimary assignment of error by all par-
ties is in respect to th·e court's findings of fact. 
Hence, if there is any competent evidence support-
ing such f~ndings, 've cannot disturb them." 
The two issues in this case which .are again attacked 
by appellant on app·eal must be considered "~thin the 
framework of the foregoing rule. 
POINT II. 
WAYNE N. STOK·ER WAS WITHIN THE ·COURSE AND 
S:COPE OF HIS EMPLOY FOR APPELLANT AT THE TIME 
OF THE COLLISION. 
Appellant is asking this court to reconsider aU of 
the evidence and inferences arising therefrom touching 
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on the question of agency, and make a finding contrary 
to that of the trial court. This court need only consider 
v1hether the finding of the trial court is supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
Sufficient evidence will be found in the testimony 
of two witnesses: Mr. Hovvard Rich and Mr. Lawrence 
W. Mansell. 
~fr. Howard Rich is the owner and proprietor of a 
roadside establishment known as Los Ricos Station on the 
highway to Dugway, Utah (R. 19). He ha.s been so en-
gaged since 1948. He had kno,vn Mr. Wayne N. Stoker 
for approximately four years prior to the collision re-
sulting in his death and knew that he was a salesman for 
appellant, Strevell-Paterson Hardware Company. Dur-
ing this four year period Mr. Stoker called at his place 
of business two or three times per month. On most occa-
sions he would give ~tfr. Stoker an order for merchandise, 
consisting of sporting goods (guns and ammunition). 
This merchandise would subsequently be shipped to him 
by appellant (R. 20). 
Testifying further, Mr. Rich stated that on October 
13, 1954 (the day of the accident) Mr. Stoker called 
at his place of business at .approximately 4 :00 P.M. (R. 
20). ~1:r. Rich placed an order with him for ammunition 
and one 12 gauge shot-gun. In addition, he gave Mr. 
Stoker $57.00 in cash for a K-22 revolver which Mr. 
Stoker had helped sell to a customer of Mr. Rich. (The 
eash -vvas never recovered.) 11r. Stoker left Los Ricos 
Station shortly after 5:00 P.M. [Counsel stipulated that 
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thereafter Mr. Stoker stopped for dinner -at another 
roadside diner called "Penny's" which is on the _road 
toward Tooele, Utah and Salt Lake City (R. 8).] The 
following day Mr. Rich learned of Mr. Stoker's death and 
called appellant concerning his order. He restated his 
order to appellant; (the identical merchandise ordered 
from Mr. Stoker) the order was filled and the merchan-
dise shipped to him (R. 20, 21, and Ex. 5). 
These facts testified-to by Mr. Rich were not, in any 
material respect, controverted by appellant. 
Mr. Lawrence vV. 1\Iansell-Treasurer of Appellant 
-then testified. Wayne N. Stoker had been employed 
by appellant as a salesman since 1948. His specific in-
structions were to call on government installations in the 
State of Utah. (Dugway, Tooele Ordnance, -:Clearfield 
N.aval Supply, etc.) He was paid a monthly salary. It 
was, of course, necessary that he use an automobile in 
his employment and for this purpose he used his private 
vehicle. At the end of each bi-n1onthly pay period he 
would submit a regular expense form for mileage, which 
was based on the nun1ber of 1uiles from the office of ap-
pellant in S.alt Lake (~ity to his points of call and return 
( R. 42, 43). He \Yas, therefore, paid for the use of his 
automobile. 
Mr. Mansell stated further, that although Mr. 
Stoker's · specific instructions \Vere to call on United 
State.s government installations, nonetheless, any other 
business which Ill r. Stoker obtained 1could be accepted 
by his cJnployer (R. 48). (Later testifying, ~Ir. l{uhre, 
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~ales1nanager of appellant, stated that their record~ 
fihowed six orders from Mr. Rich during 1954, prior to the 
Ol'der given ~fr. Stoker on the 13th of October, 1954.) 
2 Anz. Jur., Agency, Section 101 
"The liability of the p·rincipal for the acts 
and contracts of his agent is not limited to such 
acts .and contracts of the agent as are expressly 
authorized, necessarily implied from express au-
thority, or otherwise actually conferred by impli-
cation from the acts and conduct of the principal. 
All such acts and contracts of the agent as .are 
within the apparent scope of the authority con-
ferred on him, although no actual authority to do 
such acts or to make such contracts has been con-
ferred, are also binding upon the principal." 
2 Am. Jur., Agency, Sec. 104. 
"The apparent authority of the agent is the 
same, and is based upon the same elements as the 
.authority created by the estoppel of the principal 
to deny the agent's authority; that is to say, the 
two are correlative, inasmuch as the principal 
is estopped to deny the authority of the agent 
because he has permitted the appearance of au-
thority in the agent, thereby justifying the third 
party in relying upon the same as though it \Vere 
the authority actually eonferred upon the agent.'' 
Appellant cannot accept the benefits of prior orders 
frorn l\fr. Rich and then deny the authority of the agent 
on the order taken on the day of the accident when it is 
called upon to account to a third party. 
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rl.,hese faets are established: ~lr. Stoker was enl-
ploy-ed on salary by appellant to c.all on government 
installations; he was authorized to use an automobile 
in his work and paid Inileage between Salt Lake City to 
his points of c.all and return; he was in the habit of call-
ing on Mr. Rich and soliciting business for his employer 
(six orders in 1954) ; an order 'vas taken from Mr. Rich 
on the day of the accident; the identical order was phoned 
to appellant by I\1r. Rich on the day following the acci-
dent; I\1r. Stoker 'vas returning to Salt Lake City when 
the accident occurred. (This fact ''Till be fully discussed 
under Point II.) 
Appellant, for the most part, concedes these facts, 
with the exception, they say, that the testimony of ~Ir. 
Rich as to the order given Mr. Stoker, is "hard to be-
lieve." Also, appellant says that nothing is known of 
the wl1ereabouts of Mr. Stoker prior to 4:00 P.M. on 
the day of accident and, therefore, the fact that he soli-
cited from and received an order fro1n 1\Ir. Rich is in-
sufficient to bring him within the course of his employ-
ment. First, appellant is in a much better position to 
kno'v the 'vhereabouts of its .agent than is respondent. 
If there was evidence that would take him out of the 
course of his employment, I an1 sure that they would 
have produced it before the trial court. Second, the 
order placed by I\Ir. Rich amounted to $257.00 including 
the cash given for the 1(-22 revolv·er. Certainly appellant 
eannot claim that they did not receive an economic gain 
fron1 that transaction; and clearly, this single trans-
action i ~ ~ufficient to place the agent 'vi thin the course 
of his Pinployinent. 
10 
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The facts contain·ed in the record are consistent with 
the general rule governing a case where the employee is 
driving his own car. 5A Am. Jur., Automobiles, Sec. 653. 
"On the question of the liability of an em-
ployer for negligence of his employee while oper-
ating a motor vehicle in the course of his employ-
ment, the question of who owned the automobile 
involved in the accident ordinarily is not material, 
if its u.se is authorized by the employer. While the 
fact that an employee use~s his own automobile 
in the business of the employer does not make 
the latter liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for injuries inflicte,d by such employee 
in the operation of the auto1nobile, if the circum-
stances involved in the case are consistent with, 
or require, the inference that the activity in which 
the servant was engaged at the time of the tort 
complained of, and in which h·e was using his own 
car or one vvhich he had hired, was within the 
scope of his employment, the person injured may 
recover from the employer, if the servant's use 
of the, automobile or other vehicle was authorized, 
either expressly or impliedly, $**" · 
For a discussion of .a situation involving an insur-
ance agent operating over a somewhat extended area in 
his own automobile, see the Utah case of Chatelain v. 
Thackeray, 100 P.2d 191 (Utah). 
"Thackeray w.as not using an automobile for 
his 'own personal convenience and comfort,' as 
was said of the agent in American National In-
surance c·ompany v. Kennedy, supra (101 S.W. 
2d 827), he was using it in the vital pursuit of 
not only his own, but app·ellant's business, and 
he was under appellant's control, not only as to 
the results to be obtained from that pursuit, but, 
11 
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impliedly at lea.st, as to the means whereby he 
obtained them." 
Under the facts and circumstances of that case, 
Thackeray was determined to be the agent of the defend.;. 
ant insurance company. 
It is to be noted, also, that appellant does not claim 
that Mr. Stoker had abandoned his employment after he 
left the place of business of Mr. Rich or deviated from 
his route and consequently respondent will not devote 
argument to that point. It will suffice to point out that 
once the relation of agency is shown it is presumed to 
continue until the contrary is shown. Wigmore on Evi-
dence, Third Ed., Sec. 2530. In this case, nfr. Stoker 
would be the agent within the course and scope of his 
employ from Salt Lake City to his points of call and re-
turn. On the day in question, he was shown to be in the 
course and scope of his employ at the place of business 
of Mr. Rich. This would continue until his return to 
Salt Lake City, absent evidence to the contrary. No such 
evidence was presented by appellant. 
The facts amply sustain the finding of the lower 
court that Mr. Stoker "~as in the course and scope of 
his employ for appellant at th·e tin1e of the accident. 
POINT III. 
WAYNE N. STOKER, THE AGENT FOR APPELLANT, 
WAS NEGLIGENT, AND SUCH NEGLIGENCE CAUSED 
THE COLLISION. 
12 
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At the outset, it must be pointed out that certain 
statements contained in appellant's brief concerning 
the lack of evidence as to which direction each vehicle 
was traveling are not borne out by the record. 
Appellant states, "Actually, there. is no con-
crete evidence to establish in which direction 
either car was traveling." 
"Actually, the physical evidence would more 
forcibly pomt to the conclusion that Gore was 
traveling e'asterly and Stoker westerly since the 
vehicles were facing generally in .such direction 
.after the impact." 
"As heretofore pointed out ther,e is a total 
lack of direct evidence of the manner or direction 
in which Wayne N. Stoker drove his automobile 
prior to the collision. ***" 
On the 22nd day of August, 1956, respondent served 
upon appellant the following request for admissions 
pursuant to rule 36, U.R.C.P.: 
"That at the time and place of the automobile 
accident referred to in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's 
complaint, Wayne N. Stoker was operating a De 
Soto sedan, traveling in an easterly direction 
toward Salt Lake City on U.S. Highway No. 40 
and that at the time and place aforesaid the plain-
tiff's agent Richard E. Gore was op·erating a 1953 
Plymouth Station Wagon, traveling in a westerly 
direction from Salt Lake City on U.S. Highway 
No. 40." 
To this request appellant served a reply on the 13th 
day of September, 1956, stating: 
13 
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"Defendant admits the statements contained 
in paragraph 2 of said Request for Admissions.~' 
(Paragraph 2 is the statement quoted above.) 
Thus, the direction in which each vehicle was travel-
ing was established by admission. 
Both drivers were killed in the collision and there 
were no eye witnesses. The facts constituting negligence 
on the part of Mr. Stoker are based on the physical evi-
dence found at the scene of the accident. Testimony as 
to this evidence was given by Mr. A. H. Nordgren, a 
Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff from 1\!agna, Utah. 
He received a call to investig.ate this accident at about 
9:00 P.~1., October 13, 1954. How long before that the 
accident occurred is not known. When he arrived on the 
scene he found that each vehicle was severely damaged 
on the front end indicating that the vehicles had met 
head-on. IIe also found that the accident occurred in 
the westbound lane of traffic, (the lane occupied by Mr. 
Gore, respondent's agent) thus sho"ring that the vehicle 
operated by Nir. Stoker, appellant's agent, had crossed 
to the left of the center line of the highway before the 
accident. The point of ilnpact "\vas determined by locat-
ing debris and gouge n1arks on the roadway. (See Ex. 
8, which is reproduecd herein.) The debris and gouge 
marks cornn1enced three feet into the lane occupied by 
re.spondent's vehicle and continued further over toward 
the shoulder. Considering the fact that the vehicles met 
head-on at a 180° angle, it is clear that the Stoker vehicle 
was at least three feet into the lane occupied by respond-
ent's vehicle at the point of impact (R. 53-59, .and Ex. 8). 
14 
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Appellant apparently concedes that their agent was 
on the wrong side of the road and that under such cir-
cumstances a pre.sumption of negligence arises by reason 
of certain Utah decisions. 
Richards v. Palace Laundry, 186 P. 439 (Utah); 
Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg. Co., 174 P. 821 
(Utah); 
Morrison v. Perry, 140 P.2d 772 (Utah). 
However, appellant claims that such a p-resumption 
does not apply to this case by reason of this court's rul-
ing in Fretz v. Anderson, 300 P. 2d 642. First of all, that 
action could not have been brought except for the recent 
st.atute (U.C.A. 1953, 78-11-12) providing for the ~survival 
of a cause of action against the personal representative 
of a deceased wrongdoer. The case at bar was not 
brought under that statute. This action is against an 
employer on the theory of respondeat superior. The em-
ployer is liable jointly and severally 'vith the agent. 57 
C.J.S., Master and Servant, Sec. 579. 
Furthermore, this action is one for property dam-
age. As this court stated in its decision on rehearing of 
Fretz v. Anderson, 308 P. 2d 948 (Utah) the statute 
(survival of actions for injury and death against the 
personal representative of a deceased wrongdoer) doe·s 
not control a claim for p-roperty damage. 
Let us for the moment examine the content and 
me.aning of this presumption. In Morrison v. Perry, 140 
P .2d 772, this court said, · 
15 
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"Defendant in his brief says that it is true 
that when a collision occurs on the defend·ant's 
wrong side of the road a presumption of negli-
gence arises in. the absence of evidence explaining 
why his car was on the wrong side of the road. 
Defendant then vigorously argues that the 
moment an explanation is offered, the presump-
tion ceases and does not longer exist. This is true, 
but the evidence upon which the presumption was 
based remains in the case and is to be considered 
by the jury, unless there is no conflict between 
such evidence and the explanatory evidence." 
(Citing eases.) 
See also 9 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Sec-
tion 2491. 
In the absence of explanatory evidence, this pre-
sumption satisfies the plaintiff's burden of proof and 
will sustain a finding in his favor. In the ease at bar, 
no explanatory evidence was offered by appellant and the 
court found that appellant's agent v.ras negligent in being 
on the wrong side of the road. 
Now assun1e for so1ne legal reason (there was no ex-
planatory evidence) that the presun1ption is not avail-
able to the respondent. Still, as the eourt said in Morri-
son v. Perry, supra, the faets giving rise to the presulnp-
tion remain in the case, the 'veight and sufficiency to be 
determined by the trier of fact. 
In thi.s ease the fact ren1ains that appellant's .agent 
was on the 'vrong side of the road 'vhen the accident 
happened. And as this eourt said in Horsley v. Robinson_, 
186 P. 2d 592, (1Jtah) at page 599., 
\ 
16 
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"This is a finding of negligence from the 
surrounding facts and circumstances and not 
merely from the happening of the accident alone. 
It is universally recognized that negligence may 
be inferred from the happening of the accident 
and the surrounding facts and circumstances 
where the facts are such as to reasonably justify 
such inference even though there is no direct testi-
mony to establish the exact grounds of negligence 
which caused the accident." 
Therefore, even if the presumption of negligence 
were removed from the case, still from the facts of the 
accident, negligence may be inferred by the trier of fact. 
In this .case, that finding is sufficient by reason of the 
fact that cle.arly the agent of appellant was entirely on 
the vvrong sidP of the road when the accident happened. 
Further, as Professor Wigmore states in Section 3491, 
supra, this presumption is a presumption of fact and not 
law and therefore not a true presumption at all. The 
term presumption has been applied by the use of inexact 
terminology. What it is, is a factual situation which by 
reason of experience carries to a conclusion and "con-
viction of mind" with compelling force. This, I venture, 
is exactly the process by which the trial court reached 
its finding. Based, as shown, upon sufficient evidence. 
Appellant's argument th.at they are not responsible 
for their agents being on the wrong side of the road be-
cause of this court's ruling in Fretz v. Anderson, supra, 
is without merit. Carried to its extreme, it would mean 
that in a case where both drivers are killed and there are 
no eye witnesses there could be no recovery. Such a 
universal proposition will not stand the test of logic and 
reason. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
One other proposition of appellant merits comment. 
They place great stress on the testimony of an insurance 
investigator for appellant's insurer to the effect that 
vehicles traveling east on U.S. Highway No. 40 were de-
flected into the opposing lane of traffic by a depression 
in the highway at the r.aiload tracks which were about 
250 feet west of the scene of the accident. 
Sheriff Nordgren, a disinterested witness, testified 
that he had traveled the _s,ame highway at speeds of up 
to 70 mph and . had no difficulty in negotiating this 
curve (R. 67). 
In view of this conflicting testimony, the finding of 
the trial court against appellant, is conclusive. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has asked in its brief for this court to re-
examine all of the facts in this case, draw therefrom in-
ferences in its favor, and reach a result contrary to that 
of the trial court. The theory of appellant's appeal, how-
ever, is that there is insufficient evidence to justify the 
findings and judgment. 
Under that theory, this court need only deter1nine, 
indeed may only determine, whether there is evidence in 
the record to support the findings and judgment of the 
trial court. 
The facts are without material dispute and are suffi-
cient (more, they preponderate) to show that appel-
lant's agent vvas within the course and scope of his em-
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ploy at the time of this collision and the collision was 
caused by his negligence. 
The findings and judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorneys for Respondent 
511 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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